Analysts have assessed two cases of Chechen residents being prosecuted under the law on searching for extremist materials.
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The number of cases of prosecution under the law on searching for extremist materials is still too small to analyze the practice; two cases in Chechnya do not allow any conclusions to be drawn; an active hunt for violators has begun in the republic. The broad interpretation of the new law in practice raises questions.
As reported by the "Caucasian Knot," on June 23, the Achkhoy-Martan Court of Chechnya received an administrative case against a local resident charged with searching for prohibited materials online. His case marks the fifth known instance of this article being applied in Russia and the second in Chechnya.
The law on fines for searching for extremist materials was adopted by the State Duma on July 22, 2025, and signed by Putin on July 31, 2025. The law amends the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation (CAO), introducing administrative liability for intentionally searching online for materials included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials. The bill also introduced fines for advertising VPN services and recognized VPN use as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, RIA Novosti reported.
The first cases of Russian residents being held administratively liable for searching for prohibited materials online, including two cases in Chechnya, were commented on June 26 to a Caucasian Knot correspondent by Alexander Verkhovsky, head of the SOVA Research Center*, Mikhail Akhmetyev, an expert at the SOVA Center*, Svetlana Gannushkina*, chair of the Civic Assistance Committee*, and lawyer Alena Borodina.
Alexander Verkhovsky believes that punishments for "searching for extremist materials" are clearly isolated. "Only five reports are known. "In fact, it's too early to analyze the practice," he noted.
You have to know the Ministry of Justice's list by heart!
According to him, the average citizen will now have to familiarize themselves with the list of extremist materials. "How to prove intent? You have to read the regulations. So far, there's almost nothing. But generally, it's not difficult: your browser search history. And yes, you have to know the Ministry of Justice's list by heart! Moreover, materials not on the list, but simply those that are extremist in content, also qualify for prosecution," Verkhovsky explained.
Mikhail Akhmetyev reported that of the five cases, detailed information is only available about the very first one, that of Sergei Glukhikh from Kamensk-Uralsky. "In his case, the mechanism was as follows: for some reason, FSB officers were conducting operational-search activities against him, they took him to the FSB department, gained access to his phone and searched it. Judging by the published photographs, they found various ultra-right content on the phone and even a selfie with the Azov logo**, and also found queries for "Azov brigade"**, "una unso"** and "rdk"** in the browser search history. This included an image search. Since there was no practice yet, in the first version of the report, the police simply wrote that he was looking for information about the banned Azov** and rdk**, but did not specify which extremist materials they were talking about. Since the case was returned to the police, the report was drawn up again, and this time they specifically wrote that when searching for the query "Azov brigade"**, he gained access to images of the Azov chevron**. And on the Federal List of Extremist Materials there is "The Azov chevron** (to be precise, its old version, which is no longer officially used)," he said.
The expert also recalled that in the first case in Chechnya—that of Isa Magamadov—it was reported that he was accused of searching for the Telegram channels NIYSO and "TABUK," and the NIYSO movement was recognized as extremist. "However, it's unclear what exactly he found was deemed 'obviously extremist material.' These Telegram channels are not on the list of extremist materials. However, the law also defines extremist materials as works by leaders of the NSDAP and the Italian Fascist Party, speeches and images of leaders of Nazi and collaborationist organizations, publications justifying national or racial superiority, the extermination of a particular group, and so on. It's not entirely clear why NIYSO resources were deemed 'obviously extremist,' even though this movement is recognized as extremist," Akhmetyev noted.
We are punishing searches not only for materials on the list but also for other materials deemed extremist by law.
The question of whether the average citizen can know the entire federal list of extremist materials is not new and has been a topic since the list's creation and rapid growth. "Knowing the contents of the list by heart is completely impossible, and expecting every citizen to constantly consult the list is difficult—even when it comes to distributing these materials, not searching for them. Both the current version of Article 20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offenses on distributing materials and Article 13.53 on searching for them raise even more questions given that their scope is not limited to those materials included in the Federal List. After all, we punish the search not only for materials on the list but also for other materials considered extremist by law," Akhmetyev pointed out. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not even necessary to retroactively add the material to the list, he also noted. "On the other hand, Article 13.53 of the Code of Administrative Offenses does specify that it concerns 'obviously' extremist materials. It is clear that the book 'Mein Kampf' or a portrait of Goebbels could certainly be called such 'obviously' extremist materials. But in less obvious cases, it is unclear how law enforcement agencies will confirm this 'obviously' nature," Akhmetyev explained.
At the same time, he agreed with the opinion that these cases are isolated, so it is difficult to talk about the geographic scope of application of this provision.
Prohibitions attract attention, while reasonable criticism leads to a much more realistic result.
Svetlana Gannushkina* stated that this offense in itself hardly stands up to legal scrutiny. "Is it necessary to read fascist texts in order to "Do we really understand this philosophy? Or is it enough to simply accept derivative texts about it? Prohibitions attract attention, while intelligent criticism leads to much more realistic results. Especially if the critic has a good grasp of irony. Of course, young, unformed minds must be protected from the possible influence of extremist ideas. But this is a matter for educators, not judges. Forbidden fruit is sweet. At the very least, it arouses interest," she believes.
In his opinion, it cannot be said that an active hunt for violators of this article began in Chechnya. "There's too little data for statistics. But it's worth noting that they have a good sense of federal government trends," Gannushkina* pointed out.
In practice, the protection of citizens' rights depends on how thoroughly the courts review evidence of intent provided by the police.
Alena Borodina stated that the term "search" is interpreted as the user's active actions to purposefully search for information, gain access to it, and study it. "It is impossible to prosecute someone for searching for materials that were not yet recognized as extremist at the time of the search using legal means. The very wording of the offense (intentional search for something knowingly prohibited) formally protects against random fines. However, in practice, the protection of citizens' rights depends on how thoroughly the courts review evidence of intent provided by the police," she believes.
At the same time, according to the lawyer, in practice the registry's size is enormous, and the risks of a broad interpretation of the law are indeed causing serious debate in the legal community. "It is physically impossible for the average person to know the entire list of FSEM, as deputies and human rights activists directly pointed out during the discussion of the bill," Borodina noted.
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* added to the register of foreign agents.
** designated a terrorist organization, its activities are prohibited in Russia by a decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
*** Meta (owner of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp) is banned in Russia.
Translated automatically via Google translate from https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/424441



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