Russian analysts assessed the potential of the Trans-Caspian Corridor amid the war in Iran.

Taking into account economic factors, the Trans-Caspian Corridor is not capable of replacing the sea routes through the Straits of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb. However, against the backdrop of the war in Iran, its importance as an alternative route to Europe has temporarily increased, according to Russian analysts.

The role of the Trans-Caspian Corridor is incomparable with the sea route.

Moscow economist Sergei Zhavoronkov does not believe that the role of the Trans-Caspian Corridor is increasing against the backdrop of blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb.

"I don't think so. The issue isn't that there are problems transporting Chinese furniture to Europe. The issue is specifically that many countries are now experiencing problems exporting oil and gas, and for some of them, the Strait of Hormuz is the only channel (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain). In terms of oil and gas supplies, the Trans-Caspian Corridor is highly questionable. Azerbaijan uses the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to export its own oil and re-export a small portion of Kazakh oil; some supplies go through the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Novorossiysk pipelines, and recently, small rail deliveries have begun to Armenia. But how will this help, say, China, Japan, or Europe replace the lost oil or gas volumes from the Persian Gulf? Theoretically, Turkmenistan could export gas via the Black Sea in the distant future. But this has been discussed for decades, and things are still moving forward—the Turkmen authorities, to put it mildly, are peculiar," he told the Caucasian Knot.

He doubts that the Trans-Caspian Corridor can become one of the main transport routes between the EU and China.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are interested in expanding the Trans-Caspian Corridor. But there are challenges here: the shallowing of the Caspian Sea, the need for dredging, and the construction of new berths and terminals.

"I won't pretend to be a great logistics expert. There are plenty of theories, including those that claim delivery speed (for example, bypassing the Suez Canal takes only 10-12 days) isn't critical to the price of goods compared to other factors. Egypt, as we know, has significantly expanded the Suez Canal, and some believe it could replicate that. Russia is trying to revitalize the Northern Sea Route, although it is experiencing obvious problems with its tanker fleet amid deteriorating relations with South Korea, where it was primarily built. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are interested in expanding the Trans-Caspian Corridor. But there are challenges here: the shallowing of the Caspian Sea, the need for dredging, and the construction of new berths and terminals. None of this can be resolved in a month, even with political will," he pointed out.

The economist does not rule out that, given the war in Iran, there are risks for the Trans-Caspian Corridor and Azerbaijan as a whole.

21:29 05.03.2026

Baku analysts assess the consequences of the attack on Nakhchivan for relations with Iran

The drone attack on the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic was most likely intentional, but Azerbaijan will initially limit itself to diplomatic and political measures, avoiding direct military escalation, according to analysts in Baku.

"I wouldn't rule out risks for Azerbaijan: we remember the attack on Nakhchivan, and we understand where it came from. The Iranian authorities are demonstrating an attempt to avenge their problems on everyone. For example, it's difficult to interpret attacks on the oil infrastructure of Saudi Arabia or Oman any differently. "It's clear that Azerbaijan is a secondary target for them, as there are no American bases on its territory, and Azerbaijan has a response, but anything can happen in politics," he added.

At the same time, he notes, both Azerbaijan and Russia are currently benefiting from the overall rise in oil prices.

"Yes, both Russia and Azerbaijan are currently benefiting from the overall rise in oil prices. In the event of a probable US attack on Iranian export capacity, prices will continue to rise (currently, we are seeing a strange pattern where Iran is attacking the export capacity of those it considers guilty of something, and the US is not responding). Furthermore, the US lifted sanctions on some vessels in the Russian "shadow fleet," and this has reduced the discount on Russian oil from around $30 in February to $10-15 now. (On the evening of April 15, it became known that the United States does not intend to renew licenses to purchase Russian and Iranian oil, said US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during a press conference at the White House - ed. "Caucasian Knot) It's difficult to say for sure, I am speaking from estimates by international consulting agencies like Argus, the Russian authorities have long classified data on oil exports. In general, it seems to me that strategically there are two alternatives. If Trump, under one pretext or another, stops the operation without achieving the defeat of the Iranian regime, then this will contribute to a long-term increase in oil prices due to instability and the piracy practices of the Iranians, who impose arbitrary taxes on passage through the Strait of Hormuz. If Trump goes for a ground operation, this will mean the collapse of the Iranian regime somewhere within a month, both due to the cessation of exports of Iranian oil itself, and due to the regime's loss of command and control of the troops and the transition to guerrilla warfare. Then prices for "oil prices will recover quickly," concluded Sergei Zhavoronkov.

The prospects of the Trans-Caspian Corridor are limited by infrastructural and geopolitical barriers

A Russian political analyst believes that against the backdrop of blockages in the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi attacks in Bab el-Mandeb The role of the Trans-Caspian Corridor in the Strait is increasing, but only temporarily.

"Yes, the role of the Trans-Caspian Corridor is objectively increasing amid instability in key maritime straits. Blockages in the Strait of Hormuz (through which approximately 21% of the world's oil passes) and Houthi attacks on ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait are creating critical risks for global logistics. Western and Asian companies are seeking alternative routes, and the Trans-Caspian Corridor (China - Kazakhstan - Caspian Sea - Azerbaijan - Georgia - Turkey/EU) is becoming one of the few viable options bypassing Russia and the unstable Middle East. This increases the geopolitical value of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as transit hubs. However, it is important to understand that the corridor's growing role is happening from a low base—for now, it is a niche route, not a global highway. “And the most important thing is that as soon as the war is over, everything will return to normal,” he told a “Caucasian Knot” correspondent on condition of anonymity.

According to him, the volumes of sea and land transportation are absolutely incomparable, and the Trans-Caspian Corridor is not capable of replacing the sea routes through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.

“About 21 million barrels of oil per day (about 3 million tons) pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and about 6-7 million barrels (about 1 million tons) through Bab el-Mandeb. The Trans-Caspian Corridor, at best, is capable of transiting 10-15 million tons of cargo per year (not only oil products, but also containers, grain, and metals), which is a tiny fraction of sea volumes. Sea transport is 10-15 times cheaper than land transport; container ships carry tens of thousands of tons per voyage, while hundreds of tons pass through the Caspian by rail and ferries. "The Trans-Caspian Corridor is a complement, not a replacement, for sea routes, and its role is more symbolic and geopolitical than economic," he noted.

The prospects of the Trans-Caspian Corridor becoming one of the main routes between the EU and China are limited by serious infrastructural and geopolitical barriers, he is confident.

"Firstly, there is capacity - bottlenecks on Kazakhstan's railways, ferry crossings across the Caspian, and the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi are not designed for mass flows. To significantly increase cargo turnover, billions of dollars in investment in infrastructure expansion are needed, which will take 10-15 years. Secondly, there is cost - the route is 30-50% more expensive than the sea route and slower - 30-40 days versus 35-45 days by sea, making it uncompetitive for bulk cargo. Thirdly, there is geopolitics - Russia is actively lobbying for its route and could create problems for "The competing Trans-Caspian Corridor is being exploited through pressure on Kazakhstan," the analyst explained.

He believes that the war in Iran creates both risks and opportunities for all actors.

"Iran may attempt to destabilize Azerbaijan by supporting the Shiite opposition, but Iran's military potential is currently limited by the war with Israel and the United States, so large-scale aggression against Azerbaijan is unlikely. At the same time, Azerbaijan benefits greatly from the war in Iran—from rising oil prices and the strengthening of the Trans-Caspian Corridor. For Russia, the benefits are mixed. On the one hand, rising oil prices allow Russia to offset losses from sanctions and increase budget revenues. On the other hand, strengthening the Trans-Caspian Corridor is a geopolitical blow to Russia, since it bypasses Russian territory and competes with the Trans-Siberian Railway and the North-South route, which Moscow has spent billions developing. Russia loses transit revenues and geopolitical leverage over trade between Europe and Asia. Ultimately, Moscow gains "oil prices, but loses out on transit and influence in the Caspian region, where Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are increasingly oriented toward the West and China, bypassing Russia," he emphasized.

Azerbaijan receives additional revenue from oil and gas supplies

Against the backdrop of instability in the Strait of Hormuz and attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb area, interest in the Middle (Trans-Caspian) Corridor is indeed growing, but it is important not to overestimate this factor, notes economist Mikhail Krutikhin*.

"This is not about directly replacing sea routes, but about diversifying logistics, especially for cargo between China and Europe. Companies and countries are looking for alternatives to reduce risks, and in this sense, the corridor through the Caspian is becoming more noticeable. However, its role is still auxiliary, not systemically important. Infrastructure and capacity limitations prevent it from rapidly increasing volumes. Therefore, there is growth in importance, but it is gradual and within its niche,” he said.

According to him, the volumes of maritime transport through the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are orders of magnitude greater than the capacity of any land corridor, including the Trans-Caspian.

“We are talking about tens of millions of barrels of oil per day, while land routes handle significantly smaller volumes. Even at maximum capacity, the Middle Corridor will only be able to cover a very small share of these flows. Moreover, it is focused more on container and dry cargo rather than on the bulk transportation of oil. Pumping hydrocarbons requires pipelines and specialized infrastructure, which is not available in sufficient quantities. Therefore, it is incorrect to directly compare these routes - they perform different functions,” he noted.

The economist does not believe that the Trans-Caspian Corridor can be considered the main route between the EU and China.

"It can take a stable place as one of the alternative routes, especially in the context of geopolitical fragmentation. This requires investment in ports, railways, tariff harmonization, and simplified transit procedures. Coordination between the countries of the region—Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey—is also important. Without this, the corridor will be inferior in speed and cost to sea transport. At best, it will become part of a diversified logistics system, not its core," he noted.

As for the rise in oil product prices, this is generally beneficial to exporters.

"Azerbaijan receives additional revenue from oil and gas supplies. This improves budget indicators and strengthens foreign exchange earnings. However, the effect should not be exaggerated, since export volumes are limited. For Russia, the situation is more complex: on the one hand, high prices support income, on the other, sanctions and export restrictions reduce the ability to take full advantage of this. In addition, Russia is forced to sell oil from discount. Ultimately, both countries benefit, but they differ significantly in scale and terms of implementation," he concluded.

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